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Abstract

The arguments for intervention in foreign trade on national
defense grounds are described and analyzed from an economic point of
view.

First, national security considerations are introduced as

"non-economic" objectives:

social goals dictate that production,

consumption, factor employment or imports in a set of strategic
industries be at levels different from those ·emerging from a
laissez-faire competitive equilibrium.

It is shown that only when

social goals relate to imports intervention in foreign trade is
optimal.

Second, the pursuit of national defense is modeled as

generating an economic "externality" not taken into account by private
consumers and producers.

Once again only when such an externality

relates to foreign trade intervention in trade is the optimal policy.
Third, it is shown that national security may involve an optimal
response in the form of a peace time import tariff or a quota to the
threat of a war time trade embargo by adversaries.

Fourth, the

implications of the strategic use of foreign trade controls in the
form of accumulation of strategic stockpiles, economic embargoes,
denial of exports of strategic commodities or technology transfer,
etc. are analyzed formally and in the context of East-West relations.
Finally the historical experience with embargoes and sanctions is
reviewed.

It is argued that such sanctions have been largely

ineffective except under special circumstances.

The National Defense Argument For Government
Intervention In Foreign Trade
T. N. Srinivasan•

1.

IN'IRODUCTION

The arguments for intervention in foreign trade on national
defense grounds could be classified broadly into two categories.

The

first category is based on the perception that the existence and
continued operation (at specified levels of_ output) of certain
industries is deemed vital from the perspective of national defense.
In the absence of intervention such industries may either go out of
existence or else operate at inadequate levels.

If such indeed is the

case. there is the further issue of the form of intervention.

In

particular. whether intervention is called for in foreign trade is to
be established.

The second category arises at one level from an

extension of the dictum of Clausewitz that war is the pursuit of
diplomacy through other means, with strategic use of foreign tra4e
substituting for the more violent instruments of war to achieve
political objectives in international relations.

More recently

•I thank Jagdish Bhagwati and Michael Intriligator for drawing
my attention to some relevant references. Thanks are also due to Lois
Van de Velde for editorial assistance and to Joann Young for her
patience in processing several drafts.
/u/joann/TN/MmPaperRe vised
3/31/85
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Richard Cooper (1973) has gone so far as to characterize trade policy
as foreign policy.

At another level it reflects concerns that

unfettered trade with adversaries in certain commodities and services

will only strengthen their military (offensive and defensive)
capability.

In what follows the arguments under each of these

categories will be described and analyzed from an economic point of

view.

Issues relating to the spillover effects from defense to the

civilian sector of the economy are not addressed.

Section 2 models national security considerations as
'non-economic' objectives relating to production, consumption or trade
and discusses the optimal

policy interventions to achieve them.

In

Section 3 the pursuit of national defense manifests itself in the form
of an economic 'externality' that is not reflected in the utility and
profit maximizing decisions of private consumers and producers
respectively.

In Section 4 (and in the Appendix) the problem of an

optimal peacetime response (in the form of market intervention) to the
threat of a trade embargo by adversaries during emergencies or war is
investigated. Section S deals with the implications of the strategic
use of trade controls:

accumulation of strategic stockpiles (section

SA). trade off between gains from trade and national security as seen
in the literature on East-West trade (Section SB) and in a formal
model (Section SC).

Section 6 reviews the historical experience with

economic sanctions and embargoes.

Section 7 concludes the paper.
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2.

NATIONAL DEFENSE AS A NON-ECONOMIC OBJECTIVE

A.

Producti on Expansio n
It has long been argued that the viabilit y of certain indus~ri es

(particu larly manufac turing industri es) and of the availab ility of
certain factors of producti on are vital from the point of view of
nationa l defense. From Alexand er Hamilton who suggeste d in 1791 that
the independ ence and safety of a country was materia lly connecte d with
the prosper ity of its manufac tures to General Slay who is quoted by
Seabury (1983) to have said in 1980 that the U.S. cannot maintain its
position as a first-ra te military power with a second- rate industr ial
base, it is a recurrin g theme.

A case can be made for market

interven tion based on this viabilit y conside ration. One of the
simples t models for demonst rating this is the standard static model of
internat ional trade in its two commodity version.

Conside r a country

which can produce two commod ities (with due apologi es), Guns and
Butter, in any combina tion lying inside or on the boundary of the area
OTT' in Figure 1, the area being determin ed by the availab ility of
primary factors and the technolo gy of producti on of guns and butter.
Suppose further that this country can trade with the rest of the
world, exchangi ng guns for butter at a fixed price represen ted by the
slope of the straight line AB.

By producin g the combina tion P• (where

the producti on possibi lity curve T'T is tangent ial to the
in~erna tional price line AB) and trading with the rest of the world,
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our country can consume any combina tion in the larger area bounded by
OA, OB and the line AB as contrast ed with those in the area bounded by
T' T and the two axestha t are availabl e from domestic producti on
alone.

Suppose now that the domestic output

OG• of guns at P• is

deemed inadequa te from a nationa l defense point of view
adequate output is OGD.
the.outp ut

It is clear that an efficien t way to achieve

oc}J is to produce the combina tion PD and trade along the

line A'B' through PD that is paralle l to AB.
. D

.

and an

that at least 0G

In other words, given

of guns is to be produced , relying only on domestic

producti on will ~nable the country to consume any combina tion in the
area OHDPDT'--but producin g at PD and trading allows consump tion of

any combina tion lying in the larger area bounded by OA', OB' and the
line A' B'.

The cost to the economy of achievin g the national defense

objectiv e is the foregone opportu nity of consumin g any combina tion in
the region lying ~etween the two paralle l lines AB and A'B'.
In this simple analysis even though the mechanis m by which
resource allocati on and producti on decision s are impleme nted was not
spelled out, it is neverth eless clear that once at PD not availing the
opportu nity to trade along the line A'B' cannot but hurt the economy.
Bence the policy interven tion to attain the needed shift in
product ion, given that the defense objectiv e has been defined in terms
of producti on level of guns, will not involve interven tion in foreign
~ . if by interven tion is meant the restrict ion of the choice of
combina tion of guns and butter to some proper subset of those
availabl e by freely trading from the desired producti on point.
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In order to go beyond the above analysis one has to spell out
the institutional arrangements in which production and consumption
decisions are taken in such an economy.

For instance, if it is a

'command' economy, the authorities simply decide that production will

be at

pD and consumption at some point on A'B'. In the polar opposite

case of a perfectly competitive economy

atomistic producers decide

what and how much to produce (given commodity and factor prices which

they assume will be unaffected by their own decisions) on
considerations of their profit.

Given the relative price of guns in

terms of butter as represented by the slope of the line AB (or A'B')
production at P• (and not at PD) is consistent with profit
maximization.

A government wishing to shift production to PD from P•

has to provide the needed incentives to private producers, that is, it
has to ensure that the prices faced by producer makes their profit
maximization consistent with production at

pD. From Figure

1, it

is

clear that such a price is the slope of the production possibility
curve at PD (that is the slope of line CD) making guns relatively more
expensive compared to the slope of line AB.

Since the objective is to

shift production and not necessarily to restrict consumption choices,
consumers will be allowed to choose from any combination that is
achievable through trade at prices represented by A'B' through trade
from

i>°.

In other words consumer prices are the same whether

production is at P• or at

pD while producer prices are different. A

policy intervention that will achieve this wedge between producer and
consumer prices is an output subsidy to producers of guns

7

or equivalently an output tax on producers of butter. One can think of
other equivalent taxes or subsidies on factor use (see Bhagwati and
Srinivasan (1969)).

But the important point is that the intervention

affects production and does not restrict trade.

As such an import

tariff (which is equivalent to an output subsidy and a consumption tax
at the same rate on the importable) is ruled out as an instrument to
achieve the objective of national defense.
If we relax the assumption that the country faces fixed terms of
trade (the slope of AB in Figure 1) but instead it has market power in
the sense that its trading volume affects its terms of trade, an
influence not perceived, and hence, not taken into account by
atomistic domestic producers and consumers, the traditional argument
for the use of import tariff for exploiting its market power holds.
However, the introduction of national defense objective defined in
terms of the level production of guns in such a context will call for

the use of an output subsidy for gun producers (or its equivalent) in
addition to a tariff to exploit market power.

Even though the level

of the optimum tariff could be affected once such an objective is
introduced, the relevant policy intervention that is associated with
the objective is still the output subsidy.

In any case, since

producers have to be induced by the subsidy to produce what is deemed
adequate rather than rely on the market forces to achieve without
intervention, defense objective can be termed non-economic.
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B.

Consumpti on Expansion
One could have stated the national defense objective in terms of

consumpti on rather than productio n of guns.

For instance, imagine

that guns could be used for private recreatio n (thanks to NRA) as well
as for national defense. While each consumer takes fully into account
the recreatio nal value to him of his gun, being one among a large
number of consumers , he ignores the fact that his purchase of a gun
contribut es to national defense by adding to the total volume of gun
purchases in the economy.

Assuming as before the economy can trade

with the rest of the world at a fixed terms of trade and represent ing

private preferenc es (for simplicit y assuming that all individua ls are
alike) by an indifferen ce map, one can depict the non-inter vention
equilibriu m in Figure 2, with productio n at P• and consumpti on at

c•.

Clearly, the fact that private consumpti on of guns contribut es
to national defense as well means that a point other than C* from
among those available through productio n and trade will be socially

desirable ,

Since producing at any point other than P• and then

trading (at terms represent ed by the slope of AB) will only shrink the
set of available consumpti on points, adding the defense considera tion
will not dictate any change in productio n plans.

Once its

contribut ion to defense is accounted for, private consumpti on of guns
ought to be higher than at C•, say at
induced to consume at

c0 ,

<I'c·

The consumers have to be

This can be achieved by making consumers

face a relative price of guns equal to the slope of their indifferen ce
D
curve through C, i.e. making guns relativel y cheaper
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than at C•.

This involves a consumption subsidy equal to the

difference between the producer price (slope of AB) and consumer price
(slope of indifference curve through

c°).

Once again it is not

optimal to intervene in trade through tariffs or quotas.

With

national defense c.onsiderations manifesting themselves as a
consumption externality, a consumption subsidy is the appropriate form
of intervention.

Again such a subsidy will be in addition to an

optimum tariff to exploit any market power that the country may have.

C.

Export (Import) Restriction
An alternative formulation of the national defense or security

objective is in the form of restricting the volume of exports,
particularly of commodities (e.g. computers) that have both civilian
and military uses or of imports.

Seabury (1983, p. 13) for instance,

argues that 'the fact that manufactures critical to U.S. defense needs
may be made more cheaply abroad is a small comfort to anyone who would
commonsensically conclude that the resulting dependence (on imports)
would entail unacceptable risks'.

In the context of the institutional

assumptions of the previous examples, private producers and consumers
responding to the prevailing prices in the international market decide
on their privately optimal production and consumption levels, thereby
leading to an export (or import) level that may be too large from a
national security perspective.

In Figure 3, the privately optimal

production and consumption points are P• and C•, respectively,
resulting in an export of P•E guns.

To reduce the export to the level

PDED, it is natural to impose a tax on the export of guns (or
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equiv alentl y a tax on the impor t of butte r).

Such tax being an outpu t

rate)
tax and a consu mptio n subsid y on guns (both at the same
tic consu mptio n
simul taneo usly reduc es the outpu t and raise s the domes
the trade
of guns thereb y reduc ing the expor t level . Clear ly with
the targe t of
level , in this case the level of expor ts of guns, being
y an expor t or
polic y, the appro priate instru ment is a trade tax, namel
impor t tarif f.

It can be shown that for achie ving a speci fied

consu mptio n
reduc tion in expor ts, a produ ction tax by itsel f (or a
it leads to
subsid y by itsel f) is infer ior to an expor t tax in that
tion of no
great er welfa re loss to consu mers compa red to the situa
interv entio n (Bhag wati and Sriniv asan (1969 )).

D.

Employment Expan sion
t nor
It is somet imes sugge sted that neith er the level of outpu

guns, is of
the level of consu mptio n of a speci fic comm odity, say,
the skills of
inter est from the point of view ·of natio nal defen se but
this
the worke rs involv ed in its produ ction are. One can view
produ ction of
consi derat ion as requi ring that the emplo yment in the
level .
guns shoul d not be allow ed to fall below some speci fied

It is

e this is an
easy to show that the optim al polic y instru ment to achiev
to produ cers of
employment subsi dy (or equiv alentl y an employment tax)
guns (or produ cers of butte r).
secur ity
In sum, excep t in the case where natio nal defen se and
trade , trade
objec tives direc tly involv e the restr ictio n of foreig n
form of trade
taxes (or equiv alent ly quan titativ e restr ictio ns in the
e the
quota s) are not the optim al polic y instru ments to achiev
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objectives. This conclusion however does not in general hold if the
policy intervention in the form of taxes (on production, consumption,
employment or trade} or quotas involves the use of resources in their
implementation or diverts resources to lobbying activities by private
. citizens to appropriate the revenues (rents} generated by the taxes
(quotas).

For instance. under some circumstances. an import tariff

which is the optimal instrument to restrict imports in the absence of

any lobbying for the disposition of the tariff revenue. may become
inferior to a consumption tax on the importable once the resources
diverted to lobbying is taken into account.

Similarly a production or

consumption tax may not be the optimal policy instrument for achieving
national security objectives defined in terms of domestic output or
consumption once allowance is made for lobbying (Anam (1982), Bhagwati
(1984} • Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1982, 1984).

The intuitive

explanation of this phenomenon is that resources diverted to lobbying
or for enforcing the chosen policy not only shrink the production
possibility set but also distort the production possibility frontier.
Thus with lobbying there are two distortions:

the distortion due to

the policy instrument that triggered the lobbying in the first place
and the lobbying induced distortion.

The net effect of the two

distortions may vary depending upon the policy instrument used.

3.

DEFENSE AS AN EXTERNALITY

It was pointed out in Section 2B that consumption of certain
commodities may not only generate welfare to private consumers but
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contribut e to national defense as well.

A consumpti on externali ty

arose when in private consumpti on decisions its contribut ion to
national defense was not reflected .

As contraste d with this static

argument, Thompson (1979) develops two other dynamic national defense
arguments which could also generate externali ties.

In his model,

defense expenditu res are necessary social expenditu res to prevent one
nation from acquiring the assets, (i.e. capital stock) of another.
National defense expenditu res are set at a level that ensures that the
expected gains for a successfu l aggress or~ of the resources he
spends in his aggressio n are zero.

It is reasonabl e to assume that

defense expenditu res so determine d are an increasing function of
capital stock and that private investors in their investmen t decisions
that affect the capital stock will not take into account the effect of
their investmen t on defense expenditu res.

Obviously an externali ty

(in this case an external diseconom y) then arises.

A suitable ad

valorem tax on capital will be needed to internaliz e such an
externali ty in private investmen t decision profitabi lity calculus.
Thompson generaliz es the model to allow for two opposing tendencie s.
First, private c~pital accumulat ion increases the defense expenditu res
needed to deter aggressor s because an increase in capital stock
ceteris paribus increases the return to successfu l aggressio n.

Second, it increases the nation's defense capacity because, given any
level of defense expenditu res, the larger the private capital stock
the greater are the resources available for mobilizat ion in the event
of aggressio n.

Seabury (1983) for example makes a similar point:

U.S. as a guarantor of Western security has to have an ~dequate

the
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indus trial capita l that can be mobili zed during a war .

He adds that

the U.S. indus trial base (i.e. capita l stock in indust ry) should
includ e indus trial assets readil y fungib le in case of major
intern ationa l crises and confli cts.

Ignori ng the issue of the

form of
compo sition of domes tic capita l stock. whethe r the approp riate
the two
interv ention is a capita l tax or subsid y depend s on which of
tenden cies domin ates.

Thomp son's empir ical analys is based on data

in fact
from a cross sectio n of countr ies leads him to conclu de that
a
that first effect domin ates so that a capita l tax rather than
subsid y is called for on nation al defens e ground s.
and
Thomp son's second argume nt is based on the fact that in war
ing are
other nation al emerge ncies price ceilin gs and quant ity ration
often impose d.

To the extent they cannot be evaded . they result in

ment in
ration al privat e invest ors underv aluing their peace time invest
capita l stock produc ing such goods.

Thus a capita l subsid y raisin g

its peace time privat e value to its social value is called for.

Many

can be
examp les of possib le privat e underv aluatio n of invest ment
For instan ce. if indivi duals with partic ular skills are
•
forces (witho ut an option to buy out
armed
the
in
e
servic
into
d
drafte

given.

human
of one's draft obliga tion) for a wage below marke t wage, then

ime may
capita l invest ment in the acquis ition of such skills in peacet
often
be underv alued. Indeed genero us milita ry retirem ent plans have
aymen t
been justif ied on the ground s that they compe nsate for underp
ime may
during servic e. Invest ment in petrole um explor ation in peacet
of
be underv alued if during wartim e price ceilin gs and ration ing
petrole um suppli es are certai n to be impose d.
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impor t of
It is clear that peace time tarif f prote ction again st
icien t
goods subje ct to wartim e price contr ols would be an ineff
instru ment compa red to capit al subsid y.

While a tarif f would attra ct

time, it
capit al resou rces to the produ ction of such goods in peace

outpu t in
does not encou rage invest ment neede d to augment their
wartim e to the same exten t as a capit al subsi dy.

Howev er, if the

to affec t its
count ry is a suffi cient ly large impor ter of capit al as
case for an
impor t price , under the usual assum ptions there is a
t power .
optimum tarif f in order to explo it the count ry's marke

To the

contr ols on
exten t impor ts are restr icted durin g wartim e and price
in part for the
outpu ts apply as well, the optimum tarif f subst itutes
ction of impor t
capit al subsid y since it incre ases the domes tic produ
e.
compe ting capit al goods in peace time as well as wartim
ssed
In the case of goods (othe r than capit al impor ts discu
ing and
above ) that are wholl y or large ly impor ted, wartim e ration
time foreig n
price contr ols at home lead to under valua tion of peace
invest ment
invest ment in foreig n produ ction of such goods . Since
stock piling of
subsid y to foreig ners is infea sible , domes tic peace time
ative s to
such goods and/o r encou raging a foreig n carte l are altern
capit al subsi dy.
of a
Thompson also argue s citing Kahn (1960) that credi bility
willin g to commit
natio n's defen se postu re requi res that the natio n be
than
itsel f to punis hing an aggre ssor even if it costs more
capit ulatin g once aggre ssion has taken place .

In a system of major ity

vote just
votin g, so goes Thom pson's argum ent, the citize nry will
eipec ted net
enoug h resou rces to defen se that will ensur e that the
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gain to an aggressor is zero.

But in wartime when the nation's

pre-commitment is being tested, the citizenry will not find it in its
interest to devote more resources to fighting the war than its assets
are worth. Thus credible commitment dictates that the military be
assured a level of resources above what the citizenry will be willing
to vote for.

Since the military cannot tax the citizenry directly,

the ability to purchase goods and services at controlled prices
enables them to achieve the required level of real defense expenditure
levels given the level nominal expenditures voted by the citizenry.
This rationale for wartime price controls also implies that the
political process will not eliminate the peacetime undervaluation of
investment that price controls generate. Thus a corrective fiscal
intervention to offset the undervaluation is needed.
Thompson's interesting empirical analysis though casual by the
canons of econometrics, leads him to conclude that the actual fiscal
policies in the United States turn out to be close to what would be
optimal under his theory of national defense.

In his view this

occurred because the U.S. political system is guided by a compensation
principle which meant that any Pareto dominated policy has no chance
being approved.

4.

RESPONSE TO 11IE THREAT OF TRADE EMBARGOES AND SANCTIONS

Yet another rationale for intervention arising from broad
national national security grounds is based on the possibility that a
trade embargo might be imposed once hostilities break out. Indeed even
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a disruption of imports short of an embargo may have serious
consequences in an eme_rgency.

The embargo threat is just another

aspect of the fear of excessive import dependence mentioned earlier. A
partial equilibrium analysis of the implications of a trade embargo is
provided by Tolley and Wilman (1977).

Mayer (1977) and Bhagwati and

Srinivasan (1976) provide general equilibrium_ analyses. The following
discussion is based on the latter.

Consider a two-period model in

which in the first period (peace) there is no threat of an embargo and
in the second period (war or national emergency) with probability
an embargo will be imposed by the adversaries.

P

Suppose the maximum

national welfare achievable in the second period with (without) an
embargo is
. is

g

(U)

Pg+ (1~P)U.

so that the expected welfare in the second period
It is clear that as long as P, g and U are not

affected by any action taken in the first period, there is no argument
for intervention in the first period.
There are two possible but not mutually exclusive ways in which
actions in the first period could affect the outcomes in the second.
First, the production possibilities in the second period could be
influenced by actions in the first, either through investment in
capacity creation or because the first period output (capacity) levels
in various sectors of the economy restrict the choice of output levels
in the second due to, say, adjustment costs.

Second, the probability

P may depend on the choices made in the first period, for instance, on

the level of imports.

It is plausible to argue that the level of a

country's imports may be taken by its adversaries as an indicator of
the vulnerability of its economy and as such, it is nat-ural to assume

18

that Pis an increasing function of the level of imports.

It should

be stressed however that even if either of the above circumstances
prevail, there will be no case for intervention if private agents
anticipate and allow fully for the dependence of outcomes in the
second period on actions in the first.
Taking the case of investment first, it can be shown (see

Appendix) that if a risk neutral private investor correctly
anticipates the expected return to investment given that an embargo
may be imposed, there is no need for interventi.on.

If on the'other

hand, the investor either ignores the possibility of an embargo or
while correctly assessing the probability of an embargo nevertheless
does not allow for the possibility that the marginal product of
capital with embargo in place may differ from that in the absence of
an :·embargo, -intervention in the form of a investment subsidy (assuming
that the above mentioned difference in marginal products in positive)
will be called for.

If the first period choice of production levels

constrains those in the second period, once again an intervention in
the form of an appropriate production tax (or subsidy) in the first
period will be necessary if private production decision do not
anticipate and appropriately allow for the relevant effects.

Lastly,

if the probability of the imposition of an embargo is an increasing
function of the level of imports in the first period and this effect
is not allowed for in private decisions regarding imports, an import
tariff is the appropriate form of intervention.
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S.

STRATEGIC USE OF TRADE RESTRAINTS, EMBARGOES AND ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS

The threat and, less often, the impositi on of economic sanction s
by one country against another in pursuit of mainly non-econ omic goals
such as foreign policy objectiv es are of ancient origin.

From

Pericle s' Megarian decree of 432 B.C. that may have played a role in
triggeri ng the Pelopon nesian war (Hufbaue r and Schott (1983)) to the
U.S. trade embargo on Nicaragu a and the serious conside ration
allegedl y being given to imposing some economic punishm ent on New
Zealand for the latter's refusal to let U.S. naval vessels carrying
nuclear weapons into its ports, economic sanction s have been viewed as
an alternat ive to the use of force in the pursuit of policy
objectiv es.

The offer of economic concessi ons linked to changes in

the policies of the recipien t nation in directio ns desired by the
offerer is another aspect of the same phenomenon. The literatu re,
originat ing mainly from politica l scientis ts and politica l economi sts
writing on East-We st relation s generall y and U.S.--S oviet relation s in
particu lar, has been concerne d with issues relating to the
signific ance of East-We st trade in enhancin g the military as well as
economic capabil ity of the East.

Another example of the strategi c use

of internat ional trade is the policy of accumul ation of and release
from stocks of certain commod ities.

The well known recent example is

the strategi c petroleu m reserve policy initiate d by the U.S. after the
first oil shock.

Of course stockpil ing of certain non-ferr ous metals
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is of longer standing.

Even stocks of agricultu ral commoditi es that

were compiled mainly to serve domestic policy objective s have come to
have strategic significan ce in the pursuit of security objective s.
Among the economic punishmen ts being considere d against New Zealand,
apart from withdrawi ng the preferen tial treatment given to its lamb
exports by the U.S., is the possibili ty of releasing butter and other
dairy products from U.S. stocks to the internatio nal market in order
to hurt New Zealand's export earnings from the same products.

SA.

Strategic Stockpile s
Thompson 's (1979) analysis (see Section 3 above) suggested the

accumulat ion of stocks of imported goods during peacetime as an
alternativ e to an infeasibl e policy of subsidizin g foreign investors
for their peacetime undervalu ation of investmen t for wartime exports
reflectin g price controls and rationing .

Tolley and Wilman (1977) in

their study also examine the role of stockpilin g in pre-embar go times
as a way of respondin g to the threat of a future embargo.

In the

absence of any externali ties private storage activitie s will bring
about the right amount of storage in response to an embargo threat.
However, if, as was discussed in Section 4, externali ties arise,
either governmen t subsidiza tion of private storage or governmen t
storage itself may be called for.

Neither of these two analyses views

stockpilin g from a strategic perspecti ve.

Eaton and Eckstein (1984)

on the other hand develop a model in which the petroleum reserve
policy is examined in a strategic context that takes into account that
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petroleum is an exhaustib le resource so that imports for stock
accumulat ion in any period not only affect equilibriu m prices in that
period but in all future periods as well.
The model postulate s a two period world in which a single good
in each period is produced with capital stock and oil as inputs.

In

the first period the output of the single good is allocated between
current consumpti on and addition to capital stock.

Oil can be

extracted from the ground for current use and for storage.

While all

the oil left in the ground in the first period is available for
extractio n in the second, only part of the oil put in storage above
the groun4 becomes available for use in the second period thus
reflectin g cost of storage.

Total amount of oil available in the

ground may be known by all agents with perfect certainty in period 1
or alternati vely it is uncertain in period 1 but becomes known at the
beginning of period 2.

It follows that in a world of perfect

foresight in which markets for claims contingen t on any possible stock
of oil to be revealed in period 2 (in case it is uncertain ) exist in
period 1 and all agents behave competiti vely, no governmen t
intervent ion is necessary to sustain an intertemp orally Pareto-Op timal
allocatio n of resources .
From a competiti ve world Eaton and Eckstein move to a world of
I_

bilateral monopoly in which a monopoli stic seller of oil (OPEC) faces
a monopson istic buyer (US).

OPEC's strategy variables are oil prices

in the two periods and its investmen t in U.S. capital markets in the
first.

The U.S. governme nt's strategy variables are import tariffs in
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the two periods, the tax rate on OPEC's investment in the U.S. and the
level of strategic petroleum reserve accumulated in the first period.
Private agents behave atomistically correctly anticipating U.S. and
OPEC policies but treating them parametrically.
the game between OPEC and US are considered.

Alternative rules of

One dichotomy is between

open loop policies in which strategies for both periods are chosen in
the first period and feed back policies in which the strategy for the
second period is contingent on the outcome of the first period and the
choice for the first period is made taking into account its influence
on the second period choices.

Of course open loop policies may result

in time inconsistency--once the first period component of the policy
is implemented and its outcome known, one or the other of the players
may not have an incentive to implement the second period component of
his open loop policy.

Thus open loop policies may not be credible.

Within each of these categories, two types of behaviour can be
distinguished:

(i) one of the players acts as a (Stackelberg)

follower in choosing his strategy given the strategy of the other
player.

While the latter, acting as a leader sets his strategy taking

full account of the follower's reaction to his choice (ii) both choose
their strategies simultaneously acting as non-cooperative Nash players
each taking the other's choice as given.

In the case of feed back

policies, the Stackelberg or Nash behaviour applies to each period
separately while in the case of open loop policies it applies to the
choice of strategies made in the first period but applicable for both
periods.

All agents are assumed to have perfect foresight.

The U.S.
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and OPEC policy maker s correc tly antici pate the effect of their
polici es on privat e behav iour.
Even though Eaton and Eckste in are able to charac terize the
are
optima l strate gies of the player s in the above settin g, they
unable to evalua te the overa ll welfar e effect s withou t making

techno logy
partic ular assum ptions about functi onal forms that descri be
and perfer ences .

They find that the strate gic petrole um reserv e

e
policy in their model can have both desira ble and under sirabl
ences and
conseq uences for U.S. welfar e depend ing on techno logy, prefer
rules of the game.

In one scenar io in which OPEC sets its prices

gent
taking into accoun t U.S. respon se to its prices , a price contin
U.S. invent ory policy can improv e U.S and even World welfar e.

The

U.S.
author s sugges t that the reason for this is that the optima l
thereb y
invent ory policy makes U.S. demand more elasti c in each period
oly. Be
reduci ng the conseq uences of the distor tion due to OPEC monop
that as it may, their main concl~ sion is that the case for
establ ishing

SB.

strate gic reserv es is rather limite d.

Gains From Trade Versus Nation al Secur ity and Global Politi cal
Influe nce.
it
The tradit ional argume nt in favour of volunt ary trade is that

the
will take place only if it leads to gains to both partie s to
exchan ge.

In intern ationa l trade a countr y gains by pursui ng its

compa rative advant age:

with the openin g of trade it export s those

y compar ed
commo dities and servic es which it produc es· relati vely cheapl
were
to its tradin g partne r prior to trade and import s those which
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relatively more expensive to produce.

The distribution gains from

trade (measured by using some metric such as the Hicksian equivalent
variation) will depend on how far the post trade equilibrium prices
deviate from the pre-trade prices of each partner.

And anything that

has the effect of reducing the prices that a country obtains for its
exports or raises the prices it pays for its imports reduces the gains
from trade.
By viewing conflict between two countries as having the effect
of reducing export and raising import prices in their trade, Polachek
(1980) tests the hypothesis that a negative relationship between
conflict and trade exists using a ten-year-thirty-country cross
section data.

Conflict is quantified by

analyzing yearly events

rep~rted in 47 newspaper sources and coding them on a 15 point scale
representing different kinds of conflict and cooperation.

Between any

pair of countries, a measure of net conflict is obtained by computing
the difference between the frequency of conflictual events (Categories
9-15) and cooperative events (Categories 1-7).

Since the direction of

causality can run both ways (less conflict can lead to more trade and
greater trade can lead to less conflict), Polachek estimates a
simultaneous equation model in which exports, import and conflict are
endogenous and several exogenous variables are included.

He finds (p.

SS) that '--a doubling of trade on average leads to a 2Qll, diminution

of belligerence'!

In a later application of similar ideas to the

East-West trade during the period of detente Gasiorowski and Polachek

(1982) postulate that incentives to reduce conflict are related to the
desire to protect gains from trade.

If the distribution of gains is
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skewed towards one partner, the other can use it as a lever to obtain
political concessio ns.

They find a strong inverse relations hip

between trade and conflict.

With Warsaw pact having relativel y more

to gain from its trade with the U.S., trade leads to a greater
reduction in conflicts directed from Warsaw Pact to U.S. than in con
flicts directed from U.S. to Warsaw Pact.

Granger causality tests

suggested that the direction of causation is far stronger from trade
dependenc e to conflict than vice versa.

The authors also report

correlatio ns between conflict and trade in specific commodity groups.
They find that capital goods exports from U.S. and imports of
industria l supplies into U.S. from the Warsaw Pact countries have much
higher (negative ) correlati on coefficie nts than trade in other
commodity groups.

They view this finding as confirmin g that the

dependenc e of Warsaw pact countries on the West for technolog y imports
and their comparati ve advantage in supplying industria l raw material
to the West tend to moderate their conflicts with the U.S.
The perceived trade-off between gains from trade with the East
and security interests of the West has led to the impositio n of
controls on such trade (includin g controls on investmen t and
technolog y transfer, etc.) formally through a standing coordinat ing
Committee (COCOM) consistin g of all Nato countries except Iceland and
Japan.

Sweden and Switzerla nd, though not members of COCOM,

neverthel ess broadly conform to the decisions of COCOM.

There is a

vast literatur e on East-West economic relations in general and the
functionin g of COCOM imposed controls in particula r (Agnelli (1980).
Hanson (1981). Holzman and Levgold (1975), Roosa, et al. (1982)).
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Root (1984) provides a succinct exposition of the rationale of trade
controls, the inevitable conflict of interests among members of COCOM
arising from unequal incidence of the economic cost of controls in
individual countries, and other internal contradictions.

The

following discussion is based on his analysis.
The basic agreed objective of COCOM control was to prevent
Western goods and technology from adding significantly to the military
potential of the East. However the U.S. favoured the further use of
selective export restrictions for political purposes not directly
related to Western security interests and indeed attempted it
unilaterally on several occasions.

The other members of COCOM were

opposed to it on the grounds that such selective controls could not be
defined clearly let alone equitably administered and, in any case,
they were unlikely to alter Soviet behaviour.

The U.S. position was

..based on the belief in the White Bouse that the gains from East-West

trade accrued almost entirely to the East and as such, 'given Soviet
needs, expanding trade without political quid pro quo was a gift.

Our

strategy was to use trade concessions as a political instrument,
withholding them when Soviet conduct was adventurous and granting them
in measured doses when the Soviets behaved cooperatively' (Henry
Kissinger as quoted in Agnelli (1980), p. 1020).

Other branches of

U.S. government on the other hand favoured liberalized trade--~he
State department on the belief it would improve the political climate
for negotiations in other areas such as arms control and the commerce
department on traditional grounds that it would improve American
business prospects.

While the executive branch attempted to link
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even
trade to extern al behavi our of the Sovie ts, the Congre ss went
citize ns,
furthe r and linked it to Soviet treatm ent of some of its own
in partic ular Soviet policy toward s emigr ation of Jews, etc.
Even the argume nt that contro ls limite d to export of items of
ground s
poten tial milita ry use are sensib le has been challe nged on the
depend ent
that the Sovie t Union would not let itself become critic ally
r,
on Weste rn suppli ers for runnin g ~ts milita ry machin e and, furthe
nous
contro ls would merely accele rate Sovie t develo pment of indige
techno logy to substi tute for Wester n impor ts.

In the absenc e of

action s
peacet ime contro ls, it is argued , Sovie ts would refrai n from
able
that will reduce their depend ency and thus make themse lves vulner
during crises or wartim e,

This partic ular argume nt is withou t merit.

The very same behav ioural respon se of the Soviet s to peacet ime
, would
contro ls by the West, namely , accele rated import substi tution
oes to
be elicit ed if instea d of peacet ime contro ls they expect embarg
be impose d during crisis .

Indeed this is what the analys is of the

threat of embarg oes in Sectio n 4 would lead one to expect .
The essen tial point of peacet ime contro ls or embargoes in crisis
the
time is to impose an oppor tunity cost (perce ived or actual ) on
Sovie ts.

This cost is simply the forego ne gains from trade, both

static and dynam ic.

The static gains arise from resour ce saving s in

having a produ ction and trade patter n that confor ms to static
ce
compa rative advant age and the dynam ic gains arise from resour
that
saving s in having an invest ment (human and physic al) patter ns
confor m to dynam ic compa rative advant age.

The dynamic gains would

of
also includ e any favour able impact on the rate and charac ter
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resource productivity raising technical change that trade in goods and
services, particularly equipment, brings about. The gains could be
modest or large but whether the gains in productive capacity would be
used for augmenting military strength or consumer welfare depends on
Soviet policy maker's objectives.
There are again diametrically opposite views expressed in the
literature on Soviet policy maker's objectives and response.

Those

opposed to controls argue that the cost imposed on the Soviets by the
controls would be shifted entirely to the consumer or civilian part of
the economy with no appreciable

effect on the military.

Those in

favour of controls argue that even the Soviets could not impose a full
shift and the military would have to bear at least part of the cost.
Another strand in the arguments about the use of gains from trade
relates to the influence of trade with the West on economic reform
within the Soviet Union.

Some believe that with the import of

equipment and their installation, Soviets would get an opportunity to
observe the technological superiority of Western equipment and the
efficiency of their contractors over their domestic analogs, and would
then initiate and/or accelerate economic reform.

Others believe that

by importing Western technology and employing Western contractors to
install them, Soviets would be able to postpone the badly needed but
politically risky reform of the system.

This debate about Soviet

policy maker's responses sometimes degenerates into imagining two
opposing camps in the highest echelons Soviet policy making apparatus:
the 'doves' committed to 'detente', consumer welfare and peaceful

•
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policies and the 'hawks' inexorably pursuing global domination and
arguing whether Western controls strengthens the doves or the hawks.
Root (1984) correctly argues that it would be simplistic to
assume that gains from East-West trade accrues entirely to the East
and, as such, there is a cost to the West as well of trade controls.

For instance, the loss of potential profits from sales to the East
could affect the resources devoted to research and development in the
West and, hence, slow down the pace of technical change. Also freedom
of scientific exchange that is inhibited by the controls could dampen
fundamental research.
An example of Western gain from sales to the Soviets is in
respect of oil and gas_equipme nt and technology.

Such sales by

enabling the Soviets to develop their Siberian natural gas and oil
resources for sale to Western Europe and Japan would have helped the
latter to diversify their source of energy imports.

The strategic

significanc e of an assured supply of energy is obvious. The Europeans
correctly perceived this and diversifying Western sources of energy
had been U.S. objective as well.

Yet the U.S. by attempting to

achieve political objectives that related to the Soviet trial and
conviction of dissident Anatoly Shcharansky 'in 1978, Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan in 1979 and improsition of martial law in Poland 1981,
periodicall y suspended licenses for export of such equipment.
Eventually these export controls were extended even to exports by U.S
subsidiarie s abroad and of foreign-mad e products using U.S. technology
irrespective of whether such technology transfer had taken place prior
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to the imposition of U.S restrictions.

Other Western nations rejected

the U.S. policy and finally the Reagan Administration bowed to Allied
pressure.
Security and Gains from Trade;

SC.

A Simple Model

Many of the arguments of Section SB can be sharply illustrated

by the following two country model.

Each country produces three

goods, two of which are traded internationally while the third, called
Welfare of each country's

security or defense, is a non-traded good.

citizens depends only on the consumption of the two traded goods.
Consider the decision problem of one of the countries. Let C.1 denote
its consumption of good i (i
(i

=

1, 2, 3).

=

1, 2) and Q. the production of good i
1

The production possibility frontier (PPF) of this

country (given its resource endowment, not explicitly shown) is given
by:
(1)
with domain of(~, Q , ~) being determined by the resource
2

endowment.

Assuming the production possibility set of this economy to

be convex implies that Fis concave.
Suppose consumer welfare can be represented by a quasi-concave
Samuelson (direct) social utility function U(C1 ,

c2 ).

Let the

corresponding indirect utility function be v(p, Y) where pis the
relative price of good 2 in terms of good 1 and Y is consumer
expenditure in terms of good 1.

Given any p and given any level Q3

of the output of the defense good, maximization of consumer welfare is
equivalent to maximizing consumer expenditure Y which in
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turn equals the value of output of the two traded goods.

Thus

The first order condition for an interior maximum is
(3)

Equations (1) and (3) yield the optimum values of
functions of
function of

Qi

and~ as

03 and p. The maximized value Y• of Y is also a

03

and p.

< O,

It is obvious that

possibilities for Q and Q •
1
2

as increasing

G3

shrinks the production

By the envelope theorem

aY•
rp-

= Q•.
2

Now

substituting Y• for Yin the indirect utility function we get the

.

.

maximized welfare as

-

=V(Q-3 • p)

v(p. y) = v(p. Y (Q • p))
3
It can be seen that

av

= v2

a<i3

aY-• < 0
a~

aY • =
ap

• '½•>

and

av
rp- = vl

c•2

is the consumption of good 2.

+ v2

increases as long as

c•2 > Q•2

since v2

v2 (C2

decreasing in p.

> 0,

using Roy's identity where

Hence welfare V decreases asp

i.e. good 2 is being imported.

us denote by f the price at which net imports

is the autarky price.

( 4)

Thus in the region O

<;-ct;

Let

are zero i.e. p

< p < pA,

welfare Vis

32

Suppose one viewed the country depicted above as the Warsaw Pact
facing a Nato determined p either because Nato is 'large' relative to
the Pact in the markets for the two commodities or because a Nato
embargo results in the Pact facing a costlier source than Nato for its
imports, the alternative source being large as well.

Since even in

the Socialist countries the market is used for the allocation of
consumer goods, the use of the utility maximizatio n subject to a
budget constraint for depicting consumer decisions in not too
unrealistic though the assumption that effective consumer prices do
not differ from world prices is not.

Also, the assumption that

internation al prices influence production decisions is questionabl e.
Nevertheles s for the purposes of the present analysis, the additional
welfare loss imposed by price distortions in consumer and producer
decision is not central.
Suppose initially there were no trade restriction s.

_o

Let the

Pact's initial defense output and terms of trade be Q, and p
respectivel y.
1
price top •

o

A Nato imposition of trade controls raises the import
~.
If the Pact kept its defense output unchanged at Q3,

consumer welfare would go down by

1
-0
0
-0
V(~, p) - V(~ , p ).

The Pact's response to the imposition of

controls could be either to maintain consumer welfare by reducing
1
-1
0
-0
_1
defense output to~• such that V(~, p) = V(<li, p ), or
-0
maintain defense output at Q3 , let the consumers bear the cost of

Nato controls, or reduce defense output to a level between
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_ 1
_ 0
Q and Q so that both the military and the consumers bear some of
3

3

the costs.
The allocation of costs between consumers and the military may be
determined, say.by postulating that the decision makers in the Pact
maximize a welfare function W that is additively separable in consumer

welfare and security.
Security is assumed to be function S(Q,
3

•

defense output Q.

•

Q)

3

of the Pact's and Nato's

It is natural to assume that Sis an increasing

3

and concave function of Q and
3

-•
Q.

Thus W can be expressed as

3

(5)

where O

<a< 1.

Maximization of W with respect~ given

• leads to
0g·

the first order condition:

=

a

(6)

0

The assumptions that consumer preferences are convex, both goods are
normal in consUJDption and that the transformation function F(°i•

~) is concave ensure that Vis concave in

G3.

°i

By assumption Sis

concave in Q3 as well.

Thus the second order condition for a

maximum is satisfied.

Some unsurprising comparative static results

can be easily established using (6) and assuming that

_o

its solution

Og

is unique.
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aQ3

First

aa

< 0,

i.e. ceteris paribus, an increase

in the weight placed on on consumer welfare reduces

_o

optimal defense output Q •
3

Second, if an increase in

•

Nato defense output Q3 increases the marginal security product

as

(_)

of the Pact's defense output (once again a reasonable

a~
_o
assumption)

Q

3

will increase as

q•

increases.

Third, an increase in p

_o

brought about by Nato controls will increase (decrease) Q3

> (<)

as

according

O, i.e. according as the marginal welfare impact

av

of

a~

b~
defense is increased (decreased) by the price increase.

In principle

it can be of either sign depending as it does on the substitution
possibilities in production as well as consumption.
as well:

It could be zero

for example, let preferences be represented by the log

linear utility function pLog
2

2

2

c1
_2

take the form Q + Q + Q - R
2
3
1

c2

+ (1-p)Log

= 0 where

i

and let F(Oi, ~• ~)

is the resource
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Then it is easy to show that

endowment.
1

=_

V(~,p )

Log(i

2

2

=O.

so that

In such a case Nato price contr ols have no effec t

_o
on the Pact' s defen se expen diture Q

3

•3

Q ,

In the above discu ssion
assumed given .
determ inatio n of
the Pact.

the defen se outpu t of Nato, was

One could postu late a Courn ot-Na sh equili brium

Q3

•

and Q
3

by using (6) as the react ion funct ion of

..

A react ion funct ion of Nato could be deriv ed by

-

postu lating a Nato secur ity funct ion S (~, ~).

Again it is

funct ion of~
reaso nable to assume that S• is an incre asing conca ve

and -

Q

If for simp licity we assume consu mer welfa re in Nato is

3

ous to W for
insen sitive top then a Nato welfa re func tion~ analog
the Pact can be postu lated , i.e.
(7)

first order
The Nato react ion funct ion is implie d by the follow ing

•

condi tion for the maxim izatio n of W, i.e •

•

• as
.=
a>-

a<1g

0

( 8)
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• is

The assumptions that S

•

increasing and concave in Q, and - Q and

as •

3

3

•

- . is increasing in Q3 imply that~ is an increasing function of ij3
aQ3

Equation (6) and (8) together determine the Cournot-Nash equilibrium

• Q•).
3

expenditures (Q ,
3

Since by assumption Nato's reaction curve

is unaffected by changes in p, while the Pact's curve can shift up or
down, or remain unchanged, the Nash equilibrium defense expenditure of
the Pact can go up, down or remain unchanged as Nato imposes trade
controls.

6.

EMBARGOES AND SANCTIONS IN A HISTORICAL CONTEXT.

Several studies of the historical experience with embargoes and
sanctions are available (Carswell (1982), Doxey (1980), Losman (1979),
Hufbauer and Schott (1983)).

The sanctions reviewed included

unilateral as well as multilatoral sanctions, involved trade in goods
as well as financial investment and applied only to a limited set of
goods or to all goods except food, medicines and others excluded on
'humanitarian' grounds.

By and large, the success of sanctions in

achieving the objectives of those imposing them seem to be modest. By
scoring success in a scale of 1 to 4 (from failure to success) and the
contribution of sanctions to success again in a scale of 1 to 4 (from
zero to a significant contribution) Hufbauer and Schott constructed an
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overall success index by multiplying the scores.

Their review of 78

cases by policy goal and the period of imposition of sanctions lead to
the following (success means an overall index of 9 to 16).
Sanction Period
1973-1983
Pre 1973
Failure
Success
Failure
Success
Policy Goals
Modest Policy Changes
Destabiliza tion
Disruption of Military Adventure
Military Impairment
Other Major Policy Changes
Total
Source:

2

4

0

9

8
1
1
0
1

22

27

11

1

7
8
5

6

7

Hufbauer and Schott (1983), p. 75 Table 5.2.

The lack of success of sanctions particularl y in the period 1973-83 is
evident.

The reasons for lack of success were also fairly obvious.

They cite the following as the major ones:

(i) sanctions imposed were

often inadequate in relation to the objectives which were themselves
elusive, (ii) sanctions created their own antidotes in terms of
unifying t\e target country and in successfull y initiating a search
for commercial alternative s by it, (iii) allies of the target country
often offset the effects of sanctions with their support and (iv)
sanctions created backlash in the imposing country itself from lobbies
of export interests affecteds by the sanctions.

Besides imposing

country's allies may not share its goals and their trade with the
target country may offset the effect of sanctions.
Losman's (1979) review of the cases of Cuba, Israel, and Rhodesia
supports the findings of Hufbauer and Schott.

He concludes that

15

23

3

2
2
1
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partial sanctio ns coverin g only some goods have no hope of success and
embargo es agains t affluen t countri es with large econom ies are not
likely to succeed either.

of sanctio ns may fall mostly on a

The cost

s
politic ally powerl ess group in the target country (e.g. black African

in Rhodes ia, middle class in Cuba) and thus, has little influen ce in
changin g governm ent policy .

In sum he found that 'politi cal success

has not been forthco ming in any of the embargo studies , despite
sanctio ns having some very damaging econom ic result s' (Losman (1979),
p. 124).

In contra st, Carswe ll (1982) argues that the U.S. sanctio ns
against Iran imposed after the taking of hostag es, in particu lar the
blockin g of Iranian assets in the U.S., were effecti ve.

He attribu tes

the effecti veness to the unique circum stances of the case.

'First,

the blockin g was keyed to an event (the hostage seizure ) that could be
quickly resolve d, and the blockin g itself was therefo re destine d to
have the same resolu tion. Second, by acciden t of history a very large
amount of Iranian assets was under U.S. contro l, far larger than the
U.S. assets under Iran's contro l.

Third, the princip al allies of the

United States also had vital interes ts to protec t in Iran.

Thus the

United States had extraor dinary leverag e, a conditi on that did not
exist in the China-C uba-Vie tnam situati ons and is not likely to be
repeate d' (Carsw ell (1982), p. 260).

In this he is one with Doxey

(1980) who points out that the effecti veness of sanctio ns 'must be
judged on a case by case basis, and althoug h authori zed sanctio ns may
have more symbol ic value, the absence of author ization for collect ive
measure s does not necess arily rob them of efficac y.

The crucial
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factors will be the nature of objectives sought, their value to both
coercor and coerced and the resources they are prepared to invest in
them, as well as the target's ability to withstand pressure on its
own, or with outside help.

In a divided and economically

interdependent world such help is often forthcoming-except in the
hypothetical cases of extreme vulnerability amounting to total
economic dependence on the states imposing sanctions, or of universal
ostracism, the coercive properties of economic sanctions are limited'
(Doxey (1980), p. 131).

7.

CONCLUSIONS

We can be brief in our conclusions.

Economic Theory suggests

that a case can be made for intervention in a market economy on
national defense or security grounds whenever national defense
Many

requirements create some production or consumption externality.

of the forms of intervention were in terms of domestic economic policy
instruments and not in terms of restrictions of foreign trade.

Even

when trade policy is viewed in a strategic context, theory does not
lead to any unambiguous conclusions regarding its efficacy in
furthering security objectives.

Finally, the review of economic

sanctions that have been applied in the past also points to their
limited effectiveness.

Appendix

For simplicity assume that (i) there are two goods which can
be traded internationally at a fixed term of trade pin the first
period as well as in the second period in the event that there is no
embargo.

(ii) The embargo if imposed is total in the sense of

eliminating all trade.

(iii) The probability of the embargo being

(iv) The economy lasts only two periods and as such

imposed is P.

there is no scrap value to capital stock remaining at the end of the
second period.

Capital does not depreciate.

(v) One of the goods can

either be consumed or invested in additions to capital stock that
become available for productive use at the end of the second period.

CASE 1:

INVESTMENT DECISION

Let

K1

be the inherited capital stock at the beginning of

period 1. If I is investment in period 1 the capital stock available
for use in period 2 is K1 + I.

The production possibilities in

either period (assuming that the choice of output levels in period 1
do not affect similar choices in period 2) can be represented by the
transformation function Ql = F(Qi, K) where Ql is the output of

commodity i and K is the available capital stock at the beginning of
the period.

For simplicity it has been assumed that labour available

for production is exogenous and is the same in each period.
therefore not shown explicitly as an argument of

It is

2

the transformat ion function.
well.

Let good 2 be used for investment as

Let us assume that production and consumption decisions are

taken in period 2 after the uncertainty about the embargo has been

resolved.

Also since there is no scrap value for capital left at the

end of period 2, there is

no investment in period 2 regardless of the

embargo threat. Let the welfare of citizens in each period be

represented by a quasi-conca ve Samuelson social utility function U(C 1 ,

Consider first the case where an embargo is imposed in period
2.

Since the embargo precludes trade, the consumption of each good is

the same as its production.

Hence,

given I, the maximum welfare

under an embargo is~= Max U(F(Q2, K1 +I),~).

The first order

condition for an interior maximum is each
- F1 = U2 where the subscript i denotes the partial derivative of a
Ul
function with respect to its 1th. argument(i = 1, 2). Under the usual
neo-classic al assumptions about production functions, Fis concave and
U is quasi-conca ve so that the second order conditions for a maximum
are satisfied.

Again under well known conditions about the behaviour

of aarginal products and marginal utilities as output~ and
consumption s C.1 approach zero an unique interior maximum can be shown
to exist. lbe first order condition states that the marginal rate of
transformat ion - F1 in production equals the marginal rate of
substitutio n u2 tu1 in consumption . This will be met in a competitive
equilibrium in period 2 under an embargo without

3

any intervention other than lump sum transfers among individual
consumers that are needed to justify the use of the Samuelson social
utility function representat ion of consumer welfare. For concretenes s
By

let the dependence of~ on K1+I be indicated by ~(i1 + I).

~i= _: = u
dU

the envelope theorem

1

dI

F

2

where u1

and F 2 are evaluated at

the optimum value of Q2 •
Similarly Uthe maximum welfare in period 2 when there is no
embargo is given by U

=Max U[c 1 ,

c2 J

subject to

c1

+ pC

2

=

F(Q .i1 +I)+ pQ2 • The first order conditions for an interior
2

maximum are

u2

=p =-

these having the interpretati on that the

F,
1

marginal rate of transformat ion in production (- F1 ) and the
marginal rate of substitution in consumption

fixed terms of trade p.

No intervention other than lump sum transfers

is called for in supporting this allocation.

U(K

+ I) and once again

u2
(_) both equal the
Ul

ul

=

dU

where u and F are
2
1

dI

evaluated at the optimal value of

U can be written as

c1

,

c2

and~.

The choice problem in the first period can be viewed as
maximizing (with respect to

c1 , c2 ,

and~) the expected

4

welfare W = U[C 1 •

c2 ]

+ p[~ (K1 + I)P + U(K1 + 1)(1 - P)] where

p represent s the discount factor applicabl e to period 2 welfare,
subject to the constrain t

c1

+ p (C

2

+I)= F(~.

K)

+ pQ •
2

The

first order condition s can be written as

-F1
The first set of condition s have the same interpret ation as in
period 2 under no embargo and once again show that no intervent ion in
product markets or trade is called for.

The left hand side of the

second condition represent s the marginal gain in expected welfare of

an additiona l unit of investmen t in period 1 and the right hand side
represent s the welfare cost of that investmen t.

If consumers ignore

the threat of embargo they will be equating pu1 to U1p if there is
no intervent ion and the first order condition will be violated.

An

investmen t subsidy (tax) raising the return (in welfare units) by

u

pP(~ _ 1 ) will rectify the situation as long as g1 > (<) U1.
1
If consumers correctly perceive the probabili ty P but neverthel ess
ignore the possible differenc e between ~land U1 and assume it to
be U1, once again they will wrongly equate pu1 to U1p and an
investmen t tax or subsidy will be needed to correct it.

s
CASE 2:

ADJUSTMENT COSTS

To make this case dramatic let us ignore investment
possibilities and assume that the production choices made in period 1
cannot be altered in period 2.
~)where~ is the output of good 2 in period 1 and U = Max
U(C , C ) subject to
1
2

c1

+ pC

1

2

-

1

= F(~. K1) + pQ2.

The first

order condition for this maximization is

u2

_

= p.

Thus in period 2 no intervention is called for.

For

Ul
concreteness denoting the dependence of U and U on Q~ by~(~)
and U (~). by the envelope theorem we get

~l

= U1

and fi1

F 1 (evaluated at~)

and optimal values of

c1

and

maximize U[C. C ] + ~ [U
1
2
-

c2 ).

= u1

(p + F) (evaluated at~

The first period problem is to

2
2
) P + U (Q )(1 - P)] subject to C + pC
1
1
1
2

(Q

~e first or~er co~itions for a maximum

are

u

-2,
Ul

=

p and~ [U P+ U (1 - P)]
-1
1

= U (p +
1

F ).
1

If producers ignore

the fact that they have the choice of output levels only in the first

6

period, even though they know P they will behave as if the left hand
side of the latter equality was zero and equate p to - F

To

1

13 [ !! P+U ( 1-P) 1
1

1
rectify this one needs a production tax to the extent of _______

Ul
so that the marginal rate of transformation - F is equated to the tax
1

P'.""13 [U P+U (1-P >l
1
-1

inclusive price

It is easy to see that if

Ul
producers ignore P (i.e assume that it is zero) but allow for the
effect of the production constraint they will wrongly equate

l3U

1

to U (p + F ).
1

1

extent of

13 (U
-1

-

Once again a production tax, this time to the

U )P
1

will be needed to rectify the situation.

ENDOGENOUS EMBARGO PROBABILITY

CASE 3 :

Let us ignore investment and adjustment costs. However let the
probability P of an embargo being imposed be an increasing function
P(M)

of imports M of good 2 in period 1.

Then in period 2 the welfare

levels under an embargo and no embargo are obtained by setting I= 0
in the functions!! (K1 + I) and U(K1 + I) derived in Case 1.
As was shown there, there is no case for any intervention in period 2.
Now the problem in the first period is to maximize
U(C ,
1

c2 )

+ l3[P(M)~ + (1 - P(M))U] subject to

7

c1 = F(Oi,

Ki) - pM and

c2

=

<½

+ M.

In this formulati on good 2 is

imported and Mis the level of imports.
increasin g in M.

By assumptio n P(M) is

The first order condition s for a maximum can be

written as

Since by construct ion U

>U

if P (M) = 0 (i.e. if the
1

probabili ty of embargo is unaffecte d by level of imports)
- F

1

= p and no intervent ion fs called for.

If P (M)
1

>0

and

consumers (producer s) fully take it into account by equating their

u
marginal rate of substitu tion~
Ul
transform ation
f3P (M) (U

-

- F ) not top the terms of trade, but to
1
U)

1

no intervent ion is called for.

+ -------

p

(their marginal rate of

If producers

and consumers ignore the probabili ty of embargo they will be wrongly

1\&1::~ ( , l4-1l'.! !:'t!1:s

~

:·

t ~", .£,,

r

r

u2

~u l ~~d

r (

F top.

i

~en•~ i~tervent ion in the form o~ an
f3P (M)(U -

U)

ad valorem import tariff at the rate __
1_____ _ is called for to

satisfy the first order condition .

References

Agnelli, G. Cl 980):

"East-West Trade:

A European View," Foreign

Affairs, Summer, 1016-1033.
Anam, M. (1982):

"Distortion-Tri ggered Lobbying and Welfare:

A

Contributionto the Theory of Directly-Unpro ductive Profit Seeking
Activities," Journal of International Economics, 13, 15-32.

Bhagwati, J. N.

(1985):

"Tariffs and DUP Theory," American Economic

Review (Papers and Proceedings), forthcoming.
Bhagwati, J. N. and T. N. Srinivasan, 0969), "Optimal Intervention to
Achieve Non-Economic Objectives," Review of Economic Studies,
January, 27-38.
Bhagwati, J. N. and T. N. Srinivasan, 0976):

"Optimal Trade Policy

and Compensation Under Endogenous Uncertainty:

The Phenomenon of

Market Disruption," Journal of International Economics, 6,
217-336.
Bhagwati, J. N. and T. N. Srinivasan, 0982):

"The Welfare

Consequences of Directly Unproductive Profit Seeking Activities,"
Journal of International Economics, 13, 33-44.
Bhagwati, J. N. and T. N. Srinivasan, 0984):

"DUP Activities and

Economic Theory," in D. Collander (ed.), Neoclassical Political
Economy. Ballinger Publishing Company, 17-32.

Carswell, R. (1982):

"Economic Sanctions and the Iran Experience,"

Foreign Affairs, Winter, 247-265.
Cooper, R. N. (1973):

"Trade Policy is Foreign Policy," Foreign

Policy, Winter, 18-36.

2

Doxey, P. (1980):

Economic Sanctions and Internation al Enforcement ,

Oxford University Press, Second Edition.
Eaton, J. and
Reserve:

z. Eckstein (1984): "The q.s. Strategic Petroleum
An Analytic Framework," in Robert Baldwin (ed.), The

Structure and Evolution of Recent U.S. Trade Policy, University of
Chicago Press, 237-272.
Gasiorowsk i, M. and S. W. Polachek (1982):

"Conflict and

Interdepend ence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 26, 709-729.
Hanson, P. (1981):

Trade and Technology in Soviet-West ern Relations,

Colu~ia University Press.
Holzman, F. D. and R. Levgold Cl 975):

"The Economics and Politics of

East West Relations," in F. Bergsten and L.B. Krause (eds.),
World Politics and Internation al Economy. Brookings Institution ,
Washington, D.C., 275-320.
Hufbauer, G. C. and J. J. Schott (1983):

Economic Sanctions in

Support of Foreign Policy Goals, Monograph 6, Institute for
Internation al Economics, Washington, D.C ••
Kahn, R. (1960):

On

Thermnucle ar War, Princeton University Press.

Losman, D. (1979):

Internation al Economic Sanctions:

The Cases

of Cuba, Israel and Rhodesia, University of New Mexico Press.
Mayer, W. (1977):

"The National Defense Argument Reconsidere d,"

Journal of Internation al Economics, 7, 363-377.
Polachek, S. W. (1980):

"Conflict and Trade," Journal of Conflict

Resolution, 24, 55-78.
Roosa, R., M. Matsukawa, and A. Gutowski (1982):
Crossroad:

East-West Trade At A

Economic Relations With the Soviet Union and Eastern

Europe, New York University Press.

3

Root, W. (1984):

"Trade Controls That Work," Foreign Policy, 56,

61-80.
"An Economi c Basis for the 'Nationa l Defense

Thompso n, E. (1979):

Argumen t' for Aiding Certain Industr ies," Journal of Politic al
Economy , 87, 1-36.
Seabury , P. (1983):

"Indust rial Policy and Nationa l Defense ", Journal

of Contemp orary Studies, Spring, 5-15.
Tolley, G. S. and J. D. Wilman (1977):

"The Foreign Depende nce

Questio n," Journal of Politica l Economy. 85, pp. 323-347 .
Vernon, R. (1974), "Appara tchiks and Entrepre neurs:

U.S.-So viet

Economi c Relatio ns," Foreign Affairs , January , 249-262 .
Vernon, R. (1979):

"The Fragile Foundat ions of East-We st Trade,"

Foreign Affairs , Summer, 1035-10 51.

